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1 INTRODUCTION
Social networks are a major source of information about hiring and economic opportunities1 and
impact the choices people have, and more generally, who gets what in society. The question is
whether certain demographics in society are presented with opportunities that others are not.
Digital platforms, including social networks, employ algorithms that decide, often in real time,
what content is displayed to users based on data and assumptions about users and the relevance
1In 2015, Pew Research reported that "79 percent [of Americans had] utilized online resources in their most recent
job search, and 34 percent said that these online resources were the most important tool available to them." See:
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/11/19/searching-for-work-in-the-digital-era/
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of what is displayed in the content of the ad creative itself. As a result, answering the question of
whether demographic groups are disproportionately shown some opportunities requires examining
hundreds of thousands of algorithmic decisions; i.e. conducting platform-wide algorithmic audits.
Digital platform audits have been generally hard to conduct[23, 34, 35]. First, much of the
data about content and users is available only to platform operators, not third-party auditors
[31, 34, 35]. Second, even when some data is available, auditors need to augment this data with
detailed categorical information of interest. For example, if a platform operator gives researchers
access to all employment ads published on the digital platform, to conduct a meaningful audit, it
is necessary to engineer features that provide information about the employment opportunities,
i.e., what kind of job is being advertised. An auditor might not discover certain biases without this
information, such as if platform shows ads for high-skilled (and high-paying) jobs to men, and
low-skilled (and low-paying) to women. Third, and ￿nally, audits must be replicable so ￿ndings
can be veri￿ed by other researchers[35].
Our paper presents a methodology and software for auditing activity in advertising on digital
platforms. Speci￿cally, we build an auditing toolkit for the Facebook platform. Facebook currently
provides a programmatic API to access ads.2 Our audit leverages the Facebook API to get relevant
ads-and-data about their distribution among user demographics. Between October 2019 and May
2020, we collected more than 141,063 advertisements.
For the audit, the API data was augmented with category labels, which were automatically
inferred by classi￿ers we developed. These labels allow researchers to rapidly investigate ad
content distribution along di￿erent categories of interest. Our classi￿ers, which we make available
open-source, were used to classify ads by marketing categories that are regulated by law or policy
(i.e., housing, employment, credit, political, and other). Once labeled, the demographic distributions
of the advertisements were analyzed for bias. Our audit goes beyond previous experiments, and
yields a statistical distribution of advertising content among users of social media by demographic.
Policy implications. We note that advertisers are prohibited from displaying credit or job oppor-
tunities disproportionately across demographic groups under current U.S. law (primarily through
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act [18, 30] for credit opportunities, and the Civil Rights Act of
1964 [15] regulations for jobs). As a result, Facebook (and other social networks) ban targeting
people by age and gender when advertisements are for housing, employment or credit (so-called
HEC ads). However, our auditing results suggest that if advertisers published their ads as HEC
advertisers, observed di￿erences in the distribution of ads, if not a result of direct demographic
targeting, then the bias is achieved through other means such as the platform optimizing the
distribution (e.g. to maximize clicks.). It is also possible that advertisers did not mark themselves
as HEC advertisers; or, otherwise managed to circumvent the platform’s rules. Finally, it is also
possible that Facebook only includes some ads selectively in its API, and other ads (which we were
not allowed to access) corrected any biases in distribution.
In any case, an audit suggests several implications for future policy work. First, if advertisers
circumvented platform rules, stricter checks on advertisers (including spot-checking ads) may be
warranted. On the other hand, if advertisers were compliant, it would suggest that policies and
targeting prohibitions are insu￿cient, and algorithms for ads distribution must be modi￿ed.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
This paper draws on prior work in three related areas: studies of algorithmic biases in advertis-
ing; methods for uncovering statistical biases using auditing in non-digital platforms; and legal
judgments that suggest policy implications for digital platform audits.
2https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/
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2.1 Bias in advertising are hard to measure
Ad Explanations
Perhaps the simplest method for discovering if ads are disproportionately distributed to certain
demographics is by analyzing "ad explanations" provided by platforms. Ad explanations inform
users of some but not all of the reasons why they were shown a particular ad. Explanations also
signal some information about biases in distribution, and have been used in legal cases as evidence.
For example, in legal proceedings against Facebook, the Communication Workers of America [28]
used screenshots of ad explanations as evidence that the platform allowed advertisers to target
employment ads based on their age (Figure 1).
Ad explanations have limited ability in measuring distributional biases. Explanations tend not to
disclose all the traits advertisers used to target people[5, 17]. In addition, Facebook users are not
always aware that ads have links to explanations about why they were shown a given advertisement.
When users are aware of these links in ads, they have reported being "confused by the ambiguity
of the explanations" [17]. That is, ad explanations do not always make transparent to users the
targeting methods or reasons why a platform sent them a particular ad.
Fig. 1. Employment Ad and Ad Explanation from Communication Workers of America Civil Rights Lawsuit
against Facebook. Available online: https://www.onlineagediscrimination.com. Last accessed: Tuesday, June
30, 2020.
Planned experiments
Planned experiments are a method that allow us to learn how advertisers and digital platforms
could target users [4, 5, 21, 39]. In a planned experiment, researchers create ads with speci￿cally
controlled attributes. For example, researchers will create identical ads, but change one factor about
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a (treatment) ad while not changing that factor in the other (control) ad. After collecting data
about the distribution of the ads, any di￿erences observed will be used to infer how the changed
factor in the (treatment) ad correlates with any di￿erences from the control. Hence, by virtue of
the research design, planned experiments can uncover the targeting methods that make it possible
for advertisers to reach speci￿c demographics, and the platform optimizations (that advertisers do
not control) that result in disparate allocations of advertised economic opportunities. [4].
In Ali (2019) and Sapiezynski (2019), the researchers published experimental ads to Facebook,
using the Look-alike Audience (LAL) tool. On the Facebook ad portal, the LAL tool allows advertisers
to upload lists of and data about customers that have user traits that the advertiser wants to target [4].
After publishing the experimental ads, Ali et al. analyzed the distribution by gender and race (U.S.
voter data was used to infer race). In their study, bias was observed. More importantly, the ￿nding of
bias indicated that the LAL tool could be used to target Facebook users by their demographic traits.
In another planned experiment, Lambrecht and Tucker (2019) also published STEM employment
ads on Facebook [21]. The design of the experimental ad content was varied to observe how that
a￿ected to which demographics Facebook would send the ads. Their study found that more men
were shown ads for STEM employment opportunities. Older women were found to be particularly
disadvantaged in the ad distribution. The ￿nding suggests that digital platforms rely on stereotypes
("men prefer computing jobs more than women") and/or the biases of labor markets ("more men are
employed in computing jobs") to decide how to optimize the distribution of content among users.
Ultimately, despite their utility in identifying problematic features (e.g., Look-alike audience
tools, certain optimizations), planned experiments cannot describe the statistical distributions of
the ads that a platform serves as a whole. This is because advertising experiments are typically
only able to collect data about those to whom the experimental ads reached, and not data about the
demographics that were shown ads published by other advertisers.
2.2 Discrimination: economics and legal theories
In this section, di￿erent theories of discrimination from economics and law are brie￿y described,
and particular applications to digital contexts are discussed.
Statistical discrimination.
In the economics literature, statistical discrimination describes the behavior of ￿rms (or agents)
when they base hiring and employment decisions on information they have about an entire
demographic. The idea is that this discrimination is rational [19]; that is, ￿rms or economic agents
act on what they believe or assume about an entire group when making decisions where they
have incomplete information about individuals. Economic theories of statistical discrimination
suggest that decision-makers who statistically discriminate do not do so because of animus or an
“intrinsic adversity to any particular group per se” but merely to improve the perceived quality of
decisions [19]. While there is substantial evidence that human decision-makers do have habitual,
implicit biases that do not improve the quality of the decision [12], this theory is helpful for
thinking about the ways that algorithms distribute opportunities. Algorithms need not have an
“animus” towards particular individuals, but may still lead to biased decisions, especially if inputs
to computational systems that are biased themselves.
Legally Protected A￿ributes
In US law, demographic traits that should not be used in making decisions about regulated economic
opportunities are called “protected” attributes (cf. Table 1) [13, 14]. US law generally disallows for
disparate treatment based on protected attributes for outcomes relating to employment, housing,
credit, and other economic opportunities. Related to the current work, under US law, it is unlawful
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Table 1. Legally Protected Demographic A￿ributes in the US
Attribute
Age Persons age 40 years and older
Sex or Gender Includes persons who identify as non-binary and/or transgender
Sexual Orientation Includes LGBPQ+
Race Includes persons who identify as belonging to more than one race
Color Includes discrimination based on complexion
Disability Includes physical, neurological medical and mental health identities
Genetic Information Not limited to information known from genetic testing
Pregnancy status Pregnancy is also a form of gender discrimination
Ethnicity Includes persons who identify as Hispanic, Latinx, Jewish
National origin Includes discrimination based on 1st spoken language
Religion Includes discrimination against any religious group or belief
Political affiliation Includes 3rd parties
Military or veteran status Includes reserve members, ROTC
Citizen status Includes persons who are not legally recognized citizens
Association It is unlawful to discriminate against persons based on
their association with a protected class
Witness or Whistleblower It is unlawful to discriminate against persons because
they were a victim or witness of discrimination and reported it
to discriminate against persons in marketing for certain economic opportunities (e.g., housing,
employment, credit) on the basis of demographic attributes that are legally protected.
Disparate treatment
Disparate treatment is a form of discrimination where decisions that consider or account for an
individual’s demographic attributes in ways that adversely a￿ect their opportunities [22]. For
example, if an employer only o￿ers paid maternity leave to female employees, this adversely treats
men who are employed at the company. O￿ering paid parental leave only to one gender, or only to
persons who identify as male or female, is discriminatory; such a policy intentionally uses a legally
protected demographic trait (gender identity) to determine eligibility for an employment bene￿t.
Disparate impact
Even policies and decisions that are facially neutral because they are uniformly applied to every
demographic can still have di￿erent impacts on individuals from di￿erent demographic groups [22].
For example, an employer may deny paid parental leave to new parents, and apply this policy
uniformly to all its employees. However, this policy could have a disparate impact on women, who
may need to take more unpaid time o￿ for unpaid parenting than men. Such policies are said to
have disparate impact, and are illegal in the US when they discriminate against legally protected
demographic classes (see Table 1).
Proxy Discrimination
Proxy targeting is when attributes of users that are statistically correlated with protected demo-
graphic traits are used to include or exclude them from the target population [33]. Proxy targeting
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can thus be used as an implicit method to make decisions about who will receive ads when legally
protected demographic traits are not used explicitly by a platform’s algorithm to make ad decisions.
In the United States, it is unlawful to use proxies for legally protected demographic attributes
to discriminate against protected classes in marketing for certain economic opportunities (e.g.,
housing, employment, credit). For example, because US zip codes (postal codes) are so strongly
correlated with race and ethnicity, it is unlawful to exclude persons from receiving ads for housing
opportunities based on their zip code. Similarly, targeting "new college graduates", "fresh" or "young
professionals" is an illegal proxy for age discrimination [3]. Proxy targeting need not be limited to
demographic variables: requiring that applicants are able to "stand up for long periods of time",
"walk" or be "quick on their feet", when recruiting for a desk job that does not require the use of
legs or feet, could constitute discrimination on the basis of disability.
2.3 Auditing can uncover biases, improve policy enforcement
Bias auditing in non-digital contextsAudits have traditionally been used to uncover housing [7]
and employment discrimination. Such audit studies use either paired-testing or correspondence
audits, or resume study research designs[20].
In both paired-testing [7] and correspondence audits [8], near-identical candidates apply to jobs
or housing; ideally, candidates are equal in every respect except in the targeted demographic trait
(e.g. race or gender) [7, 20]. Data is then collected (such as whether candidates are o￿ered a job
or qualify for housing), which then yields evidence of discrimination, if any. Resume studies are
similar, except that they create resumes of two ￿ctitious candidates (materially identical in every
respect, except the target demographic), and apply to the same jobs. Again data such as interview
o￿ers are used to evidence discrimination. Unlike paired testing, because resumes are ￿ctitious,
they can be used to test a wider variety of traits (even where a matched pair of individuals is hard
to ￿nd).
These auditing methods have been used as legal evidence of discrimination in many employment
and housing cases. Resume studies in particular can surface statistical discrimination. We posit
that digital auditing methods such as ours can yield similar bene￿ts in digital contexts.
2.4 Algorithm Audits
Arti￿cial intelligence (AI) audits are referred to as "algorithm audits"[34] and are described as "the
collection and analysis of outcomes from a ￿xed algorithm or de￿ned model within a system"[34].
[1] Input analysis investigates whether the data used to train algorithms bias outcomes are
biased or discriminatory. Studies in the medical literature, for instance, have been conducted with
research participants who were all men. Despite this, the ￿ndings have been used to construct
diagnostic criteria for entire populations. This has led to disparate outcomes in identifying heart
disease and autism among women.
Using unrepresentative data to build models or decision-making criteria for entire populations
is problematic. For example, researchers Joy Boulamwini and Timnit Gebru (2018) conducted an
audit of facial recognition software [10]. In response, some of the investigated companies implied
in public statements that the observed errors in classifying the faces of Black men and women
were a result of using non-representative data to build the technology [34]. In alignment with what
Boulamwini and Gebru have evidenced, as well as in other researchers in the machine learning
community, it is worth stating that data is rarely the only source of bias in sociotechnical software
applications, machines or systems.
[2] Output analysis investigates if the outcomes of a system are biased or discriminatory.
First, researchers analyze if algorithms used in a system produce disproportionate impact among
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demographics. An algorithm can be perfectly unbiased mathematically-speaking, and its inputs
also, while the outputs a￿ect populations di￿erently.
2.4.1 AI methods for audits. A sock puppet audit replaces actors in traditional audits with scripts
that pretend to be users or create fake tra￿c to a speci￿c site [7, 38]. Using fake data, a sock puppet
audit aims to test if an algorithm is biased. For example, one study found racial discrimination in
Airbnb by using a sock puppet audit method where users that where identical in all aspects except
name applied to various hosts [32]. The study discovered that those with names used more often
by African-American individuals were rejected at a much higher rate than those with names used
more by White Americans [32]. One downside of sock puppet auditing is the large amounts of data
needed to demonstrate that a program or service is discriminatory. While this is made easier with
the help of computer programs, it may cause problems later if researchers violate the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act or any Terms of Service of the platform [38].
2.5 Public policy and legal considerations
In this section, we outline the policy context against discrimination, and potential policy bene￿ts
of digital audits. To keep our discussion focused, we outline the policy context in the United States,
but other countries and regions (such as the EU) have policies with similar intent.
Legal protections against discrimination. In the United States, protections against discrimination
are guaranteed under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [6], and follow-up legislation including the Fair
Housing Act [29] and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act [11]. Some states have additional protections
against discrimination. Overall, these laws prevent discrimination based on demographic traits,
such as race, religion, sex, disability, national origin, and attributes such as genetic information.
These laws consider di￿erences in opportunity to be acts of discrimination, just as di￿erences in
actual bene￿ts provided to individuals. For instance, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, it is
not necessary to refuse credit to people based on demographics to be considered discriminatory;
instead it is su￿cient for the creditor to have advertised to or discouraged people from applying
for credit based on their protected demographic traits. Similar protections exist for employment
and housing opportunities. As such, we consider advertisements to be a means for conveying
opportunities; showing people fewer employment or credit ads in essence robs them of economic
opportunity.
Reactive legal frameworks. Enforcement of anti-discriminatory regulation in the United States
is largely reactive. For instance, job seekers must demonstrate that a di￿erence in employment
opportunities exists at a particular employer, rather than employers having to guarantee that their
practices are non-discriminatory. The di￿culty and cost of proving discrimination have made
it di￿cult to systematically address discriminatory practices. However, if digital audits can be
conducted automatically or at low cost, it may be possible to monitor practices e￿ciently, and
ultimately, improve processes that work identify where systematic change is required.
2.6 Operationalizing legal protections on social networks
Civil Rights regulations imply special protections for opportunities in housing, employment, and
credit (the “HEC” categories). Recent litigation has operationalized these protections on social
networks, through a combination of technology and platform rules for ad targeting [2, 28].
In a March 2019 settlement, Facebook established “a separate advertising portal for creating
housing, employment, and credit ("HEC") ads” that has “limited targeting options" for advertisers [2].
Through technological operationalization, Facebook removed options that permit advertisers to
explicitly target users by gender, age, "multicultural a￿nity", and zip-code level or geographic
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Table 2. Advertising Class Definitions
Class De￿nition
Housing Advertises real estate property for rent or sale
Excludes mortgage, home ￿nancing or loans
Employment Recruits applicants for job openings
Includes job fairs, employment agent listings, employment services
Credit Advertises about credit, e.g., cards, rates, records;
loans, e.g., auto, student, home, personal, business;
insurance, e.g., life, medical, home, car, pet, disaster.
Political Any ad by or about political candidates, campaigns,
elected o￿cials, elections, or policy/political agendas
Other Any ad not de￿ned by the other categories
targeting of less than 15 miles in radius. Facebook’s operalization of the settlement agreement also
modi￿ed the "Lookalike Audience tool" [2] The modi￿cation made it so advertisers cannot explicitly
target demographics based on legally protected attributes. Finally, Facebook’s operalization of the
settlement agreement created new platform rules. The instituted rules state that advertisers must
create and publish HEC ads on the HEC portal [2].
However, advertiser targeting is not the only source of disproportionate ad distribution – platform
optimizations may cause biases too [4, 40]. Unlike ad targeting, rather than applying to a particular
advertisement or advertiser, platform optimizations lead to statistical biases. As a result, they may
not be prevented through rules limiting advertisers. Audits such as ours, along with established
metrics, may help operationalize protections against such statistical biases.
3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Our system has three components: an ad-querying and logging script that interacts with the Ad
Library and downloads ads; a set of classi￿ers for adding meta-information to collected ads; and a
database that allows researchers to query collected ads.
￿ery script. Our Python-based script queries and downloads ads from the Ad Library API. The
appendix lists the ￿elds and parameters used for querying the API. In our script, the parameter
"search terms" was used to conduct keyword requests for data. Facebook’s API currently seems to
limit requests to around 2,000 ads per keyword3. In addition, the script also allows users to specify
Facebook pages of advertisers of interest (such as Monster.com for job ads). Our script currently
only requests data for ads displayed in the United States, but requests both active and inactive ads
(i.e. both ads currently running on Facebook platforms and those no longer being delivered.) For
each query, we save the exact text of the ads returned, URLs of any ad images (but not the images
themselves), and the distribution of impressions by age, gender and geography. We also logged the
search terms used in each data request in our database, along with the date of the request.
Augmentation. The Ad Library allows keyword searches for speci￿c topics, but these searches are
not always relevant for legal/policy applications. For instance, searching for "jobs" or "hiring" and
only wanting to view ads recruiting applicants for employment, however, one discovers that they
3According to Facebook, the o￿cial limit is 5,000 ads per API request. However, we found that the API often returns an
error and asks developers to reduce the amount of data they are requesting if more than 2,000 ads are requested at a time.
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must wade through many political and others advertisements, such as depicted in Figure. For legal
or policy utility, downloaded ads need additional information.
We allow users to enrich ads with this additional information through augmentation. One useful
augmentation system is a set of classi￿ers that automatically classi￿es each ad into policy-relevant
categories.
We include a set of classi￿ers in our system, as described in Table 2. As detailed in Section 4, these
classi￿ers allow for reasonably nuanced classi￿cation: if an advertisement is about employment
policy, for example, the instance is classi￿ed political, because the ad pertains to a political agenda
or policy. On the other hand, an ad for a job position in an elected representative’s o￿ce is classi￿ed
as an employment opportunity, not a political ad (Figure 2). This distinction will hopefully guide
policy and legal workers when using our database, and help to identify the advertisements that
are pertinent to their work. A di￿erent augmentation system we are currently developing labels
objects in ad images, for instance, “dog”, “woman”, “construction equipment” etc.
Note that Facebook already has an internal system to identify, moderate, and remove (ad)
content that violates policy or law. However, our method and software allows for an independent
identi￿cation for external auditors, with standard performance metrics. Facebook has not released
this data about its internal system. Furthermore, the goals of auditors are inherently di￿erent from
business goals of Facebook – including social justice concerns such as hate crimes4, discrimination5,
genocide,6, sexism, misogyny, gender harassment, racism7, racial harassment8, xenophobia, anti-
religious sentiment, ableism, ageism, anti-Semitism9, white supremacy10, and violence11 In addition,
whatever system Facebook uses to monitor/moderate advertising content, the system is not usable
for external reviewers or auditors who want to track inorganic content (i.e., advertisements) on the
platform for legal, policy or human rights reasons. Our software/methods will hopefully ￿ll this
gap.
Database. Our database includes numerous tables that contain the original raw data retrieved
from the Facebook API, and tables that have the data enrichers included, as well as engineered
4Glorioso, Chris, Sola, Kristina and Stulberger, Evan (January 10, 2020). “I-Team: Anti-Semitic Trolls Impersonate Rabbis,
Stoking Hate after Hasidic Attacks.” NBC, New York: https://www.nbcnewyork.com/investigations/i-team-anti-semitic-
trolls-impersonate-rabbis-stoking-hate-after-hasidic-attacks/2257562/
5Kofman, Ava, and Tobin, Ariana (December 13, 2019). “Facebook Ads Can Still Discriminate AgainstWomen and OlderWork-
ers, Despite a Civil Rights Settlement.” ProPublica: https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-ads-can-still-discriminate-
against-women-and-older-workers-despite-a-civil-rights-settlement
6Stevenson, Alexandra (November 6, 2018). “Facebook Admits it was used to incite violence in Myanmar.” The New York
Times, New York, New York: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/myanmar-facebook.html
7Levin, Sam (September 12, 2016). “Facebook temporarily blocks Black Lives Matter activist after he posts racist email.” The
Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/12/facebook-blocks-shaun-king-black-lives-matter
8Cohen, Elizabeth (November 1, 2019). “She was called the n-word and given instructions to slit her wrists. What
did Facebook do?” CNN: https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/01/health/facebook-harassment-eprise/index.html. Guynn, Jes-
sica (August 3, 2017). “Facebook apologizes to black activist who was censored for calling out racism.” USA Today:
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/08/03/facebook-ijeoma-oluo-hate-speech/537682001
9Nelson, Blake (January 3, 2020). “Gov. Murphy pushes Facebook to do more to ￿ght anti-Semitism.”
https://www.nj.com/politics/2020/01/gov-murphy-pushes-facebook-to-do-more-to-￿ght-anti-semitism.html
10Newton, Casey (May 31, 2019). “How white supremacists evade Facebook bans.” the Verge:
https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/5/31/18646525/facebook-white-supremacist-ban-evasion-proud-boys-name-
change
11Cope, Sophia and Mackey, Aaron (August 7, 2019). “Second Circuit Rules That Section 230 Bars Civil Terrorism Claims
Against Facebook.” Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF): https://www.e￿.org/deeplinks/2019/08/second-circuit-rules-section-
230-bars-civil-terrorism-claims-against-facebook. Authors’ note: United States domestic, and not only international, terrorist
events are a problem on Facebook. We note there is sometimes bias in the reporting of what constitutes a terrorist event for
the United States generally, and ask that our readers not take this article as characteristic or de￿nitional of all terrorist
violence.
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Fig. 2. Our classifiers categorize ads for policy/legal utility. An employment Ad (C) recruits applicants for job
openings at an employer. In contrast, political and other ads (Images: A, C, D) sometimes inform users that an
employer is creating jobs.
features that augment the API data. For example, the database contains time-series tables that have
information about when an advertisement was created, and also, how long ads were displayed
to users on the Facebook platform. From these tables, users of our audit toolkit can analyze ads
by certain policy or legal events, such as the date when the Facebook settlement agreement with
civil rights organizations took e￿ect. In addition, the database contains the development, training
and test data-sets used to develop our classi￿ers. Researchers may access and use these data tables
to verify and replicate our results. Finally, the database has tables which contain ads only for a
speci￿ed HEC class (e.g., housing, employment, credit). Users may download and/or browse these
tables to monitor and explore information about HEC ads published on Facebook platforms. For a
full list of database column information, as well as tables that will be made available to our audit
toolkit users, please refer to the appendix of this paper.
4 AUDITING METHODOLOGY
Below, we describe the speci￿c audit we conducted using our system described above. For the
audit, data was collected from Facebook’s Ad Library API12. For each ad collected from the API,
Facebook provided us with data about how the ad was distributed among demographic groups and
by geographic region. Hence, the data allowed us to evaluate how the ads were distributed.
We augmented the data from the Ad Library by automatically classifying and de￿ning ads by
a primary marketing category (housing, employment, credit, political, and other). To train the
models that were used to classify the ads, we manually added class labels to 3,767 ad campaign
instances. The labels were de￿ned in a way to describe an ad’s intent or type of message. In addition
to the primary classes, we built a logical ("Rules") algorithm to produce labels for ad sub-classes
or types. For example, credit ads include sub-types or classes, such as for: student loans, debt
relief, automobile loans, and home loans or mortgages. De￿ning sub-classes allows us to identify
distributional di￿erences of particular kinds of ads within each class, which might otherwise cancel
each other out (e.g. some demographics may only see ads for debt relief, but not home loans.)
12https://www.facebook.com/ads/library
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Table 3. Advertising Objective Options
Objective Facebook Description
Brand Awareness Reach people more likely to pay attention
to your ads and increase awareness for your brand.
Reach Show your ad to the maximum number of people
Traffic Send more people to a destination such as a website,
app or Messenger conversation.
Engagement Get more people to see and engage with your post or Page.
App Installs end people to the app store where they can download your app
Video Views Promote videos to raise awareness about your brand
Lead Generation Collect lead information from people interested in your business
Messages Get more people to have conversations with your business
Messenger, WhatsApp or Instagram Direct
Conversions Get people to take valuable actions on your website, app or in Messenger,
such as adding payment info or making a purchase
Catalog Sales Create ads that automatically show items
from your catalog based on your target audience.
Store Traffic create ads to generate tra￿c to your physical store location
Table 4. Delivery Start Year, Number of Ad Campaigns






Accounting for classification performance. There are two sources of potential error in our audit.
First, our classi￿cation models may have labeled ads incorrectly. Therefore, we evaluate the models
performance in predicting advertising classes using multiple standard measures of goodness:
accuracy, precision and recall. For most primary classes, the Naive Bayes models had precision and
recall measures above 90 percent. For credit and employment ads, statistical measures of goodness
neared 97-99 percent. Performance results held when our Naive Bayes models were tested on
additional data-sets of derived labeled data (Table 7). These measures suggest that the classi￿ers
adequately classify the collected ads to audit the distribution.
A second source of error may be that we may have omitted some relevant keywords and
advertisers for querying the Ad Library. This source of error is extremely hard to measure as it
deals in unknown unknowns. However, we tried to minimize these errors by expanding the set of
keywords used over time, based on the copy of ads that we retrieved from the Ad Library. However,
we did not notice any substantive changes to the overall statistical distributions we observed based
on inclusion/exclusion of particular keywords, so this source of error is likely small.
4.0.1 Labelled Datasets for training classifiers.
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Table 5. Advertising Class Distribution, Hand-annotated data from October to December 2019.
Class Percent Example Ad Text
Housing 20.61% "4 bed / 2 bath for $209,500"
Employment 16.53% "We have found the best job for you – Check it out
FOOD SERVICE DIRECTOR, Huntingdon, PA"
Credit 18.93% "A planned visit to the vet? A quick trip to the eye doctor?
Use the CareCredit credit card to ￿nance your
out-of-pocket health expense."
Political 18.70% "Health care just gets more expensive each year.
Costs for the medicines we need keep going up.
So, why did Rep. Chris Sprowls vote FOR a bill
that will allow greedy insurance companies to
charge huge medical bills to Floridians with
pre-existing conditions?"
Other 25.24 % "Quit eating unhealthy foods to stretch your grocery dollars!
SNAP helps millions of needy families get the bene￿ts
they need to purchase nutritious foods.Discover
Discover if you qualify for the federal nutrition program
and learn how to get started on your application today."
Manually Annotated Data-set #1. From October 2019 through December 2019, we collected 25,228
distinct ad campaigns, and 3,767 campaign instances were manually classi￿ed. The labeled
data was used to train a machine learning model to automatically label each instance in our database
by advertising class (i.e., employment, credit, housing, political or other).
Manually Annotated Data-set #2. In January 2020, we collected an additional 16,805 ad campaigns
from the Facebook Ad Library API. We hand-annotated labels for 11,584 advertising instances.
The data was used to evaluate the Naive Bayes model trained on data from Oct. - Dec. 2019; and to
train and evaluate a new model.
5 MODEL DESCRIPTION
We primarily use a naive Bayes model to classify ads according to whether the advertisements
were for housing, employment, credit, political, or other opportunities. (The other opportunities
class corresponds to “Uncategorized” ads as described by Facebook. However, these are better seen
as opportunities other than housing, employment, credit or politics, so “other” seems to be more
descriptive.) In addition, we use a rules-based model for subcategory classi￿cation.
Both models use the same features, namely the text in the body of the advertisement, expressed
as a bag-of-words of unigrams and bigrams. These tokens are used as-is, and not stemmed or
lemmatized.
Naive Bayes
The Naïve Bayes (NB) model uses a Bayesian model with prior probability of term’s frequency,
used smoothing, and a multinomial distribution. Ads were classi￿ed directly as one of credit,
employment, housing, political, or other classes. Table 7 shows model performance.
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Table 6. Advertising Class Distribution, Hand-annotated data from January 2020.
Class Percent Example Ad Text
Housing 1.61% "Mark Markelz of William Raveis Real Estate just
listed this 6bd, 3ba, 3,240 sqft home in Bridgeport, CT."
Employment 7.33% "Are you a high school student looking for a job?
Premier Health is hiring high school students in
various positions throughout Southwest Ohio.
These are great opportunities to gain valuable





– Health care experience.
Start on the path to success and a
promising future with a job at Premier Health.
To view open positions and apply, please visit
https://php.referrals.selectminds.com/et/tcGA0GlB
/page/high-school-job-opportunities-65
Please share this post or tag anyone that may be interested."
Credit 31.88% "ATTENTION HOMEOWNERS: It is your last chance to
take advantage of the current federal tax credit for
Solar (decreases at the end of 2019).
You could be eligible to receive tier 1 solar panels
from Momentum Solar for
$0 out of pocket if your zip code quali￿es.
See if you qualify - http://bitly.com/PA2>BC”
Political 46.38% "Time is running out! Help us end the year strong AND
make a qualifying donation to claim the OR Political Tax Credit!"
Other 12.83% "Cyber Security is one of the fastest growing industries in
the country. The need for quali￿ed experts is huge. Learn
about the ￿exibility of our ONLINE program here!"
Rules Model
Our Rules model is primarily used for sub-category classi￿cation. It uses a matching algorithm to
determine the class-value of an instance. The Rules algorithm takes a vector of terms and searches
for those terms in the main document or body text of an advertisement. If matching terms are
found, the algorithm applies the classes label tied to that vector of terms, and otherwise, applies a
label indicating that the instance does not belong to the class.
For each category, a classi￿er learns a “term-topic" vector that contains unigrams and bigrams
that commonly occur in the text of ad instances belonging to a particular class. Ads are classi￿ed
as belonging to the class if they contain any of the terms in this term topic vector, and as not
belonging to the class otherwise. Note that this classi￿er may output more than one label for an ad
as all rules are run in parallel.
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Table 7. Performance on Test Data for Naive Bayes model for ads from 2019 and 2020
Year 2019 2020
Class Precision Recall F1 Precision Recall F1
credit 0.991 1 0.9955 1 1 1
employment 1 0.9792 0.9895 0.9677 0.9783 0.973
housing 1 0.7686 0.8692 0.98 0.8167 0.8909
political 0.754 0.8716 0.8085 0.7731 0.8288 0.8
other 0.8938 0.9662 0.9286 0.875 0.9396 0.9061
A similar set of classi￿ers (with the same features) was also created for each category of ads. We
describe its use below.
5.1 Final classification for analysis
The Naive Bayes classi￿er has generally high performance. However, for policy/legal audits, pre-
cision is more important than recall – audits would like to know if there is some statistical dis-
crimination for ads that are clearly in a particular category, rather than try and include all ads that
may be so classi￿ed. Therefore, for our reported analysis, we created an additional rules model for
each category of ads (Like our sub-categorization model, this may produce multiple labels for an
instance.)
Overall, this results in a stricter inclusion test for each category. For example, ads that are more
about credit opportunities for housing (e.g. mortgages, home improvement loans) than housing
opportunities more likely labeled as credit ads. Because the rules-model is only used as a ￿lter for
the ￿nal analysis, it only increases precision measures from Table 7 (possibly reducing recall.)
For our analysis of sub-classes of credit ads, while we only report ￿ndings here based on this
stricter inclusion test, whether or not ads were ￿ltered did not signi￿cantly change the ￿ndings.
Please inquire with authors for ￿ndings based on analysis that: (a) only classi￿ed the ads using
the Naive Bayes model, (b) only classi￿ed the ads using the Rules model, and (c) only used in the
analysis if the Naive Bayes models and the rule-based model agreed on at least one classi￿cation
(e.g. whether or not the ads was a "housing" ad).
Ethics
To our knowledge, we have complied with Facebook’s policies regarding the use of data from its Ad
Library, and more generally, platform Terms of Service (TOS). Facebook permits authorized users of
the Ad Library API to publish research about Facebook advertising. We did not intentionally collect
any Facebook user Personal Identi￿able Information (PII). However, if a Facebook user published
ads on Facebook-owned platforms using a Facebook page that is named after their real name, that
name data might be included in the Ad Library, and hence, our database.
6 FINDINGS
Our research database contains 141,063 Facebook ad campaigns for the period under study for the
audit and 1,722,559 observations of more than 80 variables for those ads. These advertisements
were collected between October 2019 and May 2020, and ran on Facebook between 2016 and May
2020 (see Table 4.)
Systemic Gender Discrimination across Facebook Advertisements. From our investigation, we dis-
covered the design of the Facebook advertising portal could bake discrimination into advertising
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against persons who do not identify their gender to Facebook or who identify as non-binary and/or
who identify a custom gender that is neither male or female.
The Facebook advertising portal only allows advertisers to target men, women or all. On the ad
portal, if an advertiser speci￿es their advertisement is for housing, employment or credit, the only
audience selection possible for gender is "all." Facebook de￿nes "all" as men and women. We do not
know whether "all" includes the gender group that Facebook calls "unknown" (in our paper we
refer to this group as "custom" since it includes persons who identify as non-binary and/or specify
a custom gender). Across every type of advertisement, persons who Facebook classi￿ed as having
an "unknown" or custom gender receive few if any advertisements, and when shown ads, are on
average between 0% and 1% of the total demographic.
Credit Advertisements
In our database, for the time period under study, there are 67,181 observations of 6,385 ad campaigns
classi￿ed as credit by the Naive Bayes model. A total of 274 advertisers published the ads on
Facebook. Despite the number of ads campaigns (6,385), only 146 of the advertisements displayed
unique text in the main text of the advertisement. This means that few advertisers published most
of the ads. Out of the ads published, many were advertisements for the same thing, even though
the ads delivered as distinct advertisements on Facebook (the ads also had individual budgets). Not
every advertisement with the same text in the ad delivered to identical proportions of demographic
groups.
In the credit ads, there were only 208 unique website links embedded in the ads; many more ads
had identical embedded URL links. Embedded website links, if clicked on by a user, open a new
browser tab that navigates to the website at the URL link. Among the ads labeled as credit, the
embedded website links might direct the user to the website where they may apply for ￿nancing or
loans, or other credit opportunities.
Gender Distribution. An estimated 57.9 percent of credit ads were sent to a greater percentage of
men; whereas, 42.1 percent of credit ads were displayed to a greater percent of women. No credit
ads were shown to a greater percentage of persons labeled as having a custom gender identity.
The distribution of credit ads among gender identity groups is notable. First, more women
are shown ads on average, as a percent of the total demographic, in every ad class except credit.
Second, more women than men use Facebook in the United States. Researchers have suggested that
the size of a demographic on Facebook could explain the distribution of advertisements among
those demographic groups. If this were true, since more women use Facebook in the United States,
more women than men would receive advertisements. However, for credit ads in our database,
the Facebook user-population of women in the United States does not explain the ad distribution
by gender demographic. Facebook would need to show more credit ads to women for the size of
the user demographic to explain the distribution of the ads; and this is not the case. Facebook,
therefore, is not likely distributing credit ads based on the representation of a demographic on the
platform. Instead, the platform and/or advertisers seem to target a speci￿c demographic (men) to
show credit advertisements.
What is remarkable, and worth noting again, is that for nearly every class but credit, more ads
have distributions that are skewed toward women, meaning women are a greater percentage of the
total demographic. In stark contrast, across advertisers and ad campaigns, a greater proportion
of credit ads were distributed to a greater percentage of men. As observed for every ad class, the
distribution of credit ads is never biased toward persons identi￿ed as having a custom gender
identity (in other words, persons who do not identify as male or female on Facebook).
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Fig. 3. Average Percentage Point of Total Demographic – Credit Ads by Gender and Age
Table 8. Credit Ads Only Shown to One Gender
Men Women Custom gender
Ad Campaigns (#) 209 210 2
Advertisers 29 32 2
Funding entities 23 22 2
Embedded Websites (#) 24 34 2
Table 9. In the above, are the number of campaigns that were only sent to: men, women or non-binary users
(Facebook labels non-binary users, "unknown" gender). The number of advertisers and entities that funded
the ads is shown below the campaign count. Finally, the number of embedded website links in the ads is
given. Ads contain links to o￿-Facebook websites, such as to loan applications, and these links constitute
embedded websites.
Employment Advertisements
In our database, for the time period under study, there were 165,853 observations of 13,250 ad
campaigns that were classi￿ed as employment ads by the Naive Bayes model.
A total of 2,926 advertisers published the ads classi￿ed as employment in our database. Despite the
number of ads campaigns, only 2,181 of the advertisements displayed unique text in the main text
of the advertisement. There were 2,254 unique website links embedded in the ads. The embedded
website links, if clicked on by a user, open a new browser tab that navigates to the website at the
URL link. Among employment ads, the embedded website links might direct the user to the website
where they may apply for the jobs advertised on Facebook, or other job opportunities.
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Table 10. Proportion of Credit Ads by Age Skew
Age Skew Percent
13 - 17 .<1%
18 - 24 3.8%
25 - 34 30.8%




Fig. 4. Average Percentage Point of Total Demographic – Employment Ads by Gender and Age
Gender Distribution. An estimated 64.8 percent of employment ads were shown to a greater pro-
portion of women (of the total demographic by gender group), while 35.2 percent were shown to a
greater proportion of men. None of the employment ads were shown to a greater proportion of
persons who do not identify their gender identity to Facebook and/or who do not identify as male
or female.
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Fig. 5. Employment Advertisement only sent to men on Facebook
Table 11. Proportion of Employment Ads by Age Skew
Age Skew Percent
13 - 17 1.2%
18 - 24 16.3%
25 - 34 30.4%




At least 49 ad campaigns for employment opportunities were displayed only to men and 58
were only shown to women13. Only 2 employment ads were displayed only to persons who were
identi￿ed as having a custom gender identity.
13For the reported numbers about employment ads only sent to one gender, we based our estimate on instances that were
classi￿ed as "employment" by both the Naive Bayes and Rules models. We did this because as reported in our Naive Bayes
model performance metrics, there is some amount of error in classi￿cation. By using the agreement between both models,
we capture a minimum estimate of employment ads that were only shown to one gender, and gain a little precision. In
future work, we are working to ￿ne-tune our algorithms further. Of note, using the Naive Bayes model, we report that
more than 400 employment ads were shown only to men, more than 500 only to women, and only 3 to persons identi￿ed as
having a custom gender
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Housing Advertisements
In our database, for the time period under study, there were 22,140 observations of 1,820 ad
campaigns that were classi￿ed as housing ads by the Naive Bayes model.
A total of 518 advertisers published the ads classi￿ed as employment in our database. Despite the
number of ads campaigns, only 210 of the advertisements displayed unique text in the main text
of the advertisement. There were 365 unique website links embedded in the ads. The embedded
website links, if clicked on by a user, open a new browser tab that navigates to the website at the
URL link. Among housing ads, the embedded website links might direct the user to the website
where they may apply for an apartment or other housing opportunity advertised on Facebook, or
other opportunities.
6.0.1 Gender Distribution. An estimated 73.5 percent of housing ads were shown to a greater
proportion of women (compared to men or persons who identify as having no gender or a custom
gender). Only around 26.5 percent of housing ads were shown to a greater proportion of men out
of the total percentage of the demographic by gender, across all age groups. None of the housing
ads were shown to more persons that Facebook identi￿es as unknown or custom gender (includes
non-binary and/or trans).
6.0.2 Age Distribution. More housing ads (35.9%) were shown to a larger proportion of persons
ages 25 to 34 years compared to housing ads in which other age groups comprised the largest
proportion of the total demographic by age. An estimated 18.6% were shown to a greater percent
of persons between the ages of 35-44, compared to the percent of the total demographic shown to
other age groups; followed by persons ages 55 to 64, for which 14.5% ads favored this demographic.
An estimated 9.6 percent of housing ads were sent to a greater percentage of persons aged 65 plus.
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Table 12. Proportion of Housing Ads by Age Skew
Age Skew Percent
13 - 17 1.6%
18 - 24 7.7%
25 - 34 35.9%




Of all housing ads, the least were distributed in a biased fashion toward persons in the age ranges
of 18 to 24 (7.7%) and 13 to 17 years (1.6%).
The trend in the distribution indicates that the age groups in which persons who attend college
graduate and/or enter the labor market are favored to receive housing ads. Again, these numbers
represent the percent of housing ads that have distributions biased or skewed in favor of an age
group. However, if we examine the average percent of the total demographic that an age group
typically represents in this distribution, the bias toward persons ages 25 to 44 remains.
Limitations
Our ￿ndings could be limited by our data collection method and the use of algorithms to classify
ads by their primary and secondary advertising categories. In addition, we have not yet analyzed
the data by dimensions available to us. For this paper, our audit work did not explore variance in
the distribution of ads by geographic region or time period. We also did not analyze if the image or
video media embedded in advertisements impacts the distribution of ads.
7 FUTUREWORK
There is a lot of potential in future work in this ￿eld. In the coming months, we are planning
to study whether Facebook’s inferences about the kind of ad content users prefer to be shown
matches users’ actual preferences. This is really important to study, as it is possible that Facebook’s
inferences on user preferences is statistically discriminatory and does not accurately represent
the true preferences of the user in question. Facebook, in a lawsuit, suggests that it makes more
sense from a business standpoint to show women ads for items such as cosmetics or clothing, while
showing men ads for professional sports, as these are seen to be the general trend in preferences
by gender [41, 43]. However, this is clearly a stereotype, and makes it harder for users to receive
ads on actual areas of interest.
Furthermore, these comparisons on preferences are not really valid, as it might not be completely
accurate to rank all forms of content in the same ranking. We could study whether it would be more
representative of user preferences to rank preferences for seeing types of content that informs users
about economic opportunities separately from a ranking about consumer opportunities. So, job
opportunities would be ranked separately to consumer opportunities like buying clothes, cosmetics,
sporting equipment and so on.
Another possible avenue of research could involve studying advertising trends and distributions
in other countries around the world, to observe whether the labour market distribution is in￿uenced
by the distribution of ads about economic opportunities. For example, we could study advertisements
in India, and observe whether the distribution of economic opportunity ads re￿ects facts about the
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labor market, such as the female labour force participation rate of 27% [36]. To accurately check
this re￿ection, we could compare this statistic to the distribution of job opportunity ads on the
platform in India.
8 DISCUSSION
Advertisements for economic opportunities are not distributed proportionally or equally on Face-
book by gender and age among persons living in the United States.
Gender. Women are a larger percent of the total demographic shown advertisements. However,
in evaluating the distribution of advertisements by class and sub-class, men are a larger percent
of the demographic that receives ads for credit, particularly new lines of credit and ￿nancing.
Meanwhile, ads for debt relief are disproportionately shown to women. Discrimination against
women is endemic in credit markets. Research evidences that women are denied credit opportunities
more often, and are o￿ered worse terms for credit, if o￿ered any credit at all. Importantly, in the
United States, credit discrimination disproportionately impacts Black and African American women.
Persons who do not identify their gender identity to Facebook, or who identify as neither male
or female, are rarely, if ever, shown credit ads of any type. When users either do not identify a
gender on their Facebook pro￿le, or identify as non-binary and/or trans, Facebook counts them as
having an "unknown" gender identity. Across every class of advertisement, people identi￿ed as
having an "unknown" gender, on average, are less than 1 percent of the total demographic shown
any ad, if shown ads at all.
Discrimination against LGBPQ, transgender and/or non-binary persons is systematic and per-
vasive but hard to measure in the United States [9, 27]. Based on our audit ￿ndings, Facebook
needs to: (a) publicly explain if the HEC advertising portals are designed to send ads to every
gender by default, and (b) speci￿cally, if the default options on the portal disproportionately exclude
non-binary and/or persons who are transgender from receiving ads for economic opportunities.
Facebook should consult with LGBTQ+ advocacy, policy and community organizations to discuss
ways to measure and account for how ads for economic opportunities are distributed among persons
who identify their gender as non-binary and/or transgender, gender identities speci￿ed by users,
and those who choose not to identify. We recommend that Facebook consult the HCI Guidelines
for Gender Equity and Inclusivity developed by Morgan Klaus Scheuerman and coauthors [26].
Race and Ethnicity. Facebook claims that their platform does not allow advertisers to target
users by race or ethnicity, including when advertisements are for economic opportunities. At the
same time, Facebook provides tools to advertisers to help them learn which user attributes are
proxies for demographic traits, including race and ethnicity. Meanwhile, the Facebook Ad Library
API does not provide researchers any information about the distribution of ads by race or ethnicity.
Facebook claims the reason why the Ad Library does not provide this data is the privacy of users.
However, the Ad Library API only provides aggregate and anonymous demographic data at the
state and not town, city or county level. Therefore, it would be nearly impossible to identify any
individual Facebook users from statistics describing how ads were distributed by race and ethnicity.
If Facebook cares for the privacy of users, and speci￿cally about the privacy of data about their
race and ethnicity, Facebook should not provide advertisers tools that help them target users by
race and ethnicity. Given Facebook’s track record on civil rights, until then, we recommend that
Facebook make aggregate and anonymous data publicly available via the Ad Library API about the
distribution of advertisements by race and ethnicity at the state level.
Facebook allows advertisers to learn about and use proxy attributes to target users by race, but
provides no information about the distribution of ads by race and ethnicity. Auditors, therefore,
and the public, have no way to analyze if patterns of racial discrimination in credit markets are
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re￿ected in the distribution of economic opportunities on Facebook platforms.
Responsibility for Harm. In civil rights lawsuits, Facebook has argued that advertisers are to
blame for discrimination on its platform, and that it merely provides “neutral” tools to advertisers.
However, in a settlement of legal charges, Facebook promised to, and subsequently changed the
design of the advertising portal.
Advertisers must now use the HEC advertising portal when publishing ads for housing, employ-
ment, and credit (so-called HEC ads). The HEC portal does not allow advertisers to target users
by gender and age. The HEC portal also limits the proxy attributes that advertisers can use to
target users. If changes to the advertising portal indeed prevented advertisers from using protected
demographic or proxy attributes to target users, then we would expect that no HEC ads would be
distributed only to one gender or age demographic group.
Our audit reveals that ads are not only disproportionately sent to one gender identity, but the
distribution of ads is skewed by age, and importantly, some ads are still only sent to one gender. That
ads for economic opportunities are still only sent to one demographic, while others are excluded,
suggests that the changes to the Facebook advertising portal do not prevent discrimination in the
distribution of HEC ads.
One possible explanation of this is that advertisers did not disclose that their ads were HEC
related, and so were not subject to limitations of targeting. Second, it is possible the ad-distribution
algorithm improperly optimizedwho should see advertisements, leading to systematic biases. Finally,
it is possible that advertisers still managed to ￿nd proxy variables that allowed discrimination (see
below).
Regardless of the speci￿c cause, our research suggests that much of this bias can be reduced. We
discuss some potential mitigation approaches below.
Proxy Targeting. Even if advertisers cannot target speci￿c genders, races and ethnicities, the
Facebook Audience Insights page allows advertisers to ￿nd proxies for these various attributes
by displaying data like device activity, work, and education that can be ￿ltered by gender, age,
location, and multicultural a￿nity. While this may be a useful tool for analyzing and predicting
the impact of a given ad, it also introduces the possibility of targeting not constrained by law. Thus,
Facebook allows advertisers to reinforce current biases and inequalities by identifying proxies for
various groups of people through Audience Insights data.
The quantitative impact of proxy targeting on the demographic distribution of ad viewers may
be investigated more deeply in the future to determine if these proxies are a workaround for
the regulations on discrimination and targeting. More investigation into ways to restrict proxy
targeting should also be considered.
New questions and opportunities Our work also suggests new questions for fairness and
user rights. We hope, by writing this paper, to start a discussion about when disproportionate
distribution is irrelevant, and when it is harmful. For instance, is a 1 percent di￿erence between
the percentage of the demographics that were shown content advertising reasonable? What about
15 to 20 percent di￿erence? In the remaining sections, we discuss considerations of harm, fairness
and (in)equity in allocating resources.
22
Auditing Digital Platforms for Discrimination in Economic Opportunity Advertising June 2020, MD4SG
Stereotypes in Algorithmic decision-making. Algorithms are used in the decision making process
in various di￿erent scenarios and contexts, including but not limited to: providing credit, hiring
processes, housing loans, and more generally, advertisement distributions. Algorithms predict the
future behavior of individuals using imperfect information/data that they have from past behavior
of other individuals who belong to the same socio-cultural group [25]. If we take the example of
credit advertisements, then we can see that this statistical discrimination perpetuates a reinforcing
cycle over iterations. If the quali￿cation of a certain group, for example women, was historically
lower than a dominant group, then the algorithm will not preference individuals from the dis-
advantaged group in the distribution of credit ads among demographics. Further, as algorithms
are written, developed and tested by humans, it is possible for personal biases and personally held
stereotypes to seep in.
The distribution of advertisements for economic opportunities on Facebook re￿ect social stereo-
types perpetuated in the United States. For example, advertisements for new credit lines are shown
more to men, while advertisements for debt relief are shown more to women. Di￿erent types of
job ads, which we brie￿y explored in this paper, are also distributed with an algorithm that shows
signs of stereotyping. While women on the whole received more job ads than men, the positions
advertised were traditionally roles ￿lled by women like “secretary” or “nurse” whereas men were
more likely to receive ads for traditionally masculine work such as construction. Thus, the division
of labor by gender reinforces the general stereotypes of each gender.
Legal and Ethical responsibilities of Platforms. In accordancewith Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider”14. In other words,
a platform cannot in theory be held accountable for the content which is published on it – be it
individual user posts or large-scale advertisement campaigns. However, since these platforms are
the ones providing the tools for advertisements to be distributed, it is our belief that they should be
responsible for designing these tools such that they cannot be misused.
1447 U.S.C. § 230, url = "https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230"
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Although Facebook limits the direct targeting options for HEC ads, it still relies on advertisers
to self-disclose that their ad falls into one of these categories, thus allowing an opportunity for
exploitation. Proxy targeting also o￿ers a workaround for some of the targeting limitations on
protected classes. It can be argued that, since such actions are outwardly prohibited by the platform,
Facebook should not be held accountable when advertisers choose to disobey its rules. However, our
￿ndings and the above discussion show that such misuses are not uncommon, and thus demonstrate
structural ￿aws in the way Facebook handles advertisements on its platform. Indeed, the company
has been previously involved in lawsuits on the premise of unfair advertisement distribution despite
not being the entity which publishes the ads [24, 42].
The unfair distribution is important to consider, particularly when it comes to protected classes
such as gender or race, because it may lead to reinforcement of existing societal inequalities and
biases. If one ad for a STEM position is disproportionately targeted towards men, it will likely
result in a man being hired for this position; if a hundred of di￿erent ads are, it might then provide
further support for the stereotype of women not being interested in STEM jobs, and the reality
of them not getting equal opportunities to apply for such positions. Because of this, we believe
that it is important to hold large platforms accountable for the way they allow their often-massive
user bases to be reached by marketing campaigns. Advertisers may choose to post ads which are
dishonestly classi￿ed or targeted beyond the permitted categories using proxies, but these exploits
are available solely because of the way Facebook functions as an advertising platform. This makes
it Facebook’s responsibility to maintain and update the tools it o￿ers to advertisers if it wants to
lower the availability of such exploits.
Ultimately, our software and method for auditing Facebook advertising supports and also con-
tributes new directions to the algorithm and digital platform auditing literature. First, analyzing
the demographic distribution of economic opportunity advertisements across advertisers, adver-
tisement campaigns and over time is important. Preliminary ￿ndings from our Facebook audit
indicate that evidence produced from advertising experiments do not necessarily generalize to
describe overall trends in the distribution of advertisements on platforms. In other words, while
experiments are useful for learning how features of digital platforms and ads could bias distri-
butions on platforms, the studies do not necessarily inform us about how ads are distributed in
the wild among demographic groups. Collecting and analyzing data provided by digital platforms
can allow us to compliment experimental methods with data about the demographic distribution
of ads. We applaud Facebook for making this data available, suggest that Facebook assess and
make improvements to the Ad Library API, and encourage digital platforms that distribute or
impact the economic opportunities people have, to create and release data APIs for transparency,
accountability and auditing of their platform.
9 CONCLUSION
Over the course of history, legalized and illegal discrimination has segregated markets, institutions
and communities [16, 20, 37]. At the heart of concern is that digital platforms and their advertising
networks increasingly decide how to allocate economic opportunities among demographics, and that
the historical nature of societal inequity is re￿ected in the outcomes. Disparities in the distribution
of economic opportunity in the United States is a historic problem, disproportionately impacting
persons who identify as Black and African American, Latino/a/x, LGBQ+, and disabled. Gender
and age discrimination compounds the impact of historic and present-day discrimination. Digital
platforms that also discriminate compound the impact of prior biases in society over time, and have
also called into question the legitimacy of judiciary or legal systems, the possibility of criminal and
civil justice, and the democratic process itself.
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Remarkably, (digital) discrimination is not always viewed as overt or hostile. It sometimes
manifests as an (algorithmic) preference for a familiar or favored group(s). At the same time,
discrimination is also sometimes overt.15 For example, our audit uncovered systemic bias in the
allocation of opportunities on a major advertising platform, Facebook. In particular, persons
classi￿ed as having a custom gender, meaning they either did not wish to disclose their gender
identity to Facebook, and/or do not identify as male or female, were shown few if any advertisements
for housing, employment or credit (so-called HEC ads). Women were also disadvantaged. Most
credit ads were distributed to a greater percentage of men. Finally, the distribution of most HEC
ads evidenced an age bias. These audit ￿ndings are problematic and indicate that digital platforms
and advertising networks reproduce historical and present-day societal biases that marginalize
demographic groups. Future research should investigate the extent to which our audit ￿ndings
generalize to platforms and advertising networks where regulated economic opportunities are
advertised.
Measuring harm in the distribution of economic opportunities that are advertised on digital
platforms is hard. First, access to platform and particularly demographic distribution data is limited.
Second, while legal rules establish causes for action under the law, U.S. federal rules tend toward a
minimum standard, and ignore undesirable bias on digital platforms. Third, beyond legal minimums,
we should also care about equity in the allocation of opportunities. However, it is challenging to
measure and determine if a distribution is acceptable. People, communities, as well as societies,
have di￿erent de￿nitions of what is a permissible allocation of economic opportunities in society.
For example, research shows that while "most White Americans accept basic principles of equal
opportunity, at the same time, [they] resist the implementation of policies that would increase
equality directly"[20].
Bias in advertising on digital platforms could be addressed by removing interface features that
allow advertisers to target users by demographic traits. However, it is debatable whether removing
such features would su￿ce to redistribute the balance of economic opportunity ads. Instead, digital
platforms and advertising networks might need to take a proactive human-centered approach.
For example, digital platforms could add features that allow users to instruct the platform to send
them advertisements for economic opportunities only or most often when opportunities are more
urgently needed, such as when unemployed or searching for work. Compare this to the status
quo, at present, digital platforms permit advertisers to send job opportunities only to the already
employed.
In researching if the allocation of advertising is a social problem, we adopted and emphasize
the sentiment that "roles for computing in social change" include "diagnostic" work [1]. That is,
research which uncovers undesired outcomes but forgoes technological solution-ism. In this role,
the aim of computing work is to produce evidence for broader e￿orts that seek to create socially
just systems. In this paper, we demonstrated a methodology to document and monitor how a digital
platform allocates economic opportunities. Our ￿ndings indicated that digital platforms cannot
simply, as they have done, tell advertisers not to use demographic targeting if their ads are for
housing, employment or credit. Instead, advertising must actively monitored. In addition, platform
operators must implement mechanisms that actually prevent advertisers from violating norms and
policies in the ￿rst place. Governments also have a role in improving the status quo. Incentives
for making platform and advertising network data available to third-party auditors are needed.
Penalties under the law that discourage audits by criminalizing certain digital audit methods (e.g.
web scraping) need to be removed. Finally, government regulators could ease business concerns
15Devah Pager and Diana Kara￿n. January 2009. “Bayesian Bigot? Statistical Discrimination, Stereotypes, and Employer
Decision Making.” Annals of the American Academy, AAPSS, 621.
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by issuing regulatory and legal guidance, and by providing technical assistance to help platform
operators comply with established rules.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Description of Advertisement Database
Table 12, on the following page, lists the variables or features that are available for advertisements
in our database.
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Table 13. Variables in Ad Database
Variable Description
archiveID ID that locates the ad in the Ad Library
ad_creation_time Time and date (UTC) that the ad was created
text Text displayed in the main body of the ad
url_caption If an ad has an embedded website link,
this is the text that appears in the link
url_description If an ad has an embedded website link,
this is the text the appears with the link
url_title If an ad has an embedded website link,
this is the text the appears as the link Title
ad_delivery_start_time Time and date (UTC) an ad started running
ad_delivery_stop_time Time and date (UTC) an ad stopped running
embedded_url A permanent URL link to the location of the ad in the Ad Library
currency Currency used to pay for the ad
funding_entity Name of the person or organization that paid for the ad
impressions Minimum & Maximum impressions
potential_reach Minimum and maximum potential audience size
page_id ID for the Facebook page that ran the ad
page_name Name of the Facebook page that ran the ad
publisher_platforms List of platforms that the ad was displayed on
region_distribution Geographic distribution by U.S. state. Given as a percentage
spend Minimum & Maximum money spent on an ad
age age range for the observations in the instance/database row
gender gender identity for the observations in the instance/database row
percentage_demographic percentage of the total demographic shown an ad
predicted_label Predicted marketing class of the ad
ad_subClass Predicted subclass of the ad marketing class
max_percentage Maximum percentage of the demographic sent an ad
max_genderDemographic Gender that is greatest percentage of demographic
max_ageDemographic Age group that is the greatest percentage of demographic
startTimeDayOfWeek Day of the week that the ad started running
stopTimeDayOfWeek Day of the week that the ad stopped running
adStartWeek Week of the year that the ad started running
adStopWeek Week of the year that the ad stopped running
adDuration_Seconds Number of seconds that ad ran on the platform
adDuration_Minutes Number of minutes that ad ran on the platform
adDuration_Hours Number of hours that ad ran on the platform
adDuration_Days Number of days that ad ran on the platform
adDuration_Weeks Number of weeks that ad ran on the platform
adDuration_Months Number of months that ad ran on the platform
adStart_Semester Whether ad started running in the 1st or 2nd half of the year
adStop_Semester Whether ad stopped running in the 1st or 2nd half of the year
startQuarter Financial quarter that ad started running on the platform
stopQuarter Financial quarter thatad stopped running on the platform
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